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Abstract: 
 
This paper attempts to shed light on the over-investment debate by 
investigating listed firms in China. Firms with higher level of fixed asset 
holding, higher level of overhead expenses, and being covered by the 
tax-favor policy in China are found to be associated with a lower 
risk-adjusted performance. In addition, the tax-favor policy itself 
encourages fixed asset investment. In contrast to some of the previous 
literature, state-ownership of firms, dividend policy, and ownership 
concentration are not robust predictors of risk-adjusted performance, and 
debt level, managerial shareholding, and profit per unit of asset are not 
robust predictors of fixed asset investment.  
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1. Introduction 
This study is motivated by several strands of the literature. First, it is related to the 
phenomenal economic growth of China. Figure 1 demonstrates that, after accounting for inflation, 
the real GDP of China has increased by almost 100% in less than a decade. Among the many 
explanations that have been suggested, the over-investment theory is among the few that have 
received attention in the media and academic circles.1 For instance, several authors have studied 
the issue mainly from the domestic side, including Aziz and Cui (2007), Chinn (2006), Kuijs 
(2006), Liang (2006), and Makin (2006), among others. It would be fair to say that a consensus 
has yet to be reached. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
The over-investment theory can also be approached from the firm side. The concept is very 
simple: if Chinese firms do indeed over-invest, then the corresponding rates of return on capital 
would be low. Bai et al. (2006) provide a careful empirical study on the return of capital in China 
and find that the return is not actually low, which seems to suggest that China may not be 
over-investing. Cooper (2006, pp. 97-98) argues that, among other factors, “China contains 
millions of people on the move and other millions who desire and are able to upgrade significantly 
the quality of their housing … agriculture still accounts for nearly half of the labor force. China 
still has a relatively low capital-labor ratio in the productive sectors and ample unskilled labor; 
thus the investment boom may continue for some years without pushing down rates of return.” 
Blanchard (2006, p. 92), however, finds that “private firms have much higher rates of return than 
state firms,” which suggests that the over-investment theory might receive more support when the 
ownership structure of firms is taken into consideration. This paper will provide an indirect test of 
these statements.  
Many researchers in China have also joined the over-investment debate by studying the fixed 
asset investment behavior of companies listed on the Chinese stock market, as fixed asset 
investments arguably have more reliable data at the firm level. Wei (1999) and Zhao and Wang 
                                                              
1 Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the literature. Among others, see Chow (2002), 
and the references therein.  
(1999) believe that there is no effective supervision in Chinese firms, which could result in 
over-investment in fixed assets. Yuan et al (1999) suggests that, because the cost of raising capital 
is relatively low, Chinese firms tend to over-invest in fixed assets. He and Ding (2001) analyze the 
fixed asset investment strategy of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Market. They find that 
this decision is positively related to the cash flow volumes in these companies, instead of the 
volume of capital that firms can raise in the financial market. The analysis by Wei and Liu (2004) 
finds the same relationship between cash flow and fixed asset investment. In contrast, Quan, Jiang 
and Chen (2004) show that fixed asset investment in large and listed firms is less sensitive to cash 
flow. The empirical work of Jiang and Sheng (2005) suggests that company debt will not constrain 
firms’ asset investments in most cases.  
In light of these contributions, this paper attempts to complement the literature by focusing 
on fixed asset investment in China at the firm level. From casual observations and our private 
correspondence with industry participants, it seems that corporate real estate (CRE) constitutes a 
major share of the fixed assets. The reasons are easy to envisage. As documented by Gordon 
(1990), and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), the real price of capital goods (adjusted 
for efficient units) has a clear downward trend. This means that the value of capital goods (such as 
machines and equipment) experience both physical depreciation (due to wear and tear) and 
economic depreciation (due to price drop). In contrast, land and property values in China have 
displayed an upward trend in recent years. In addition, the composition of fixed assets (CRE 
versus equipment) is itself endogenous, and the real estate boom in China seems to encourage 
corporations to shift more resources to CRE instead of equipment. In fact, the issue is so serious 
that the Chinese government recently ordered 78 state-owned enterprises, whose core business is 
not in the real estate sector, to withdraw from the real estate market (Hong Kong Economic 
Journal, 2010). Thus, throughout this paper, we will use “fixed asset investment” and CRE 
interchangeably, although conceptually they are clearly different subjects.2 
                                                              
2  An anonymous referee correctly points out that machinery and corporate real estate are different 
subjects. On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view, the two share several common features. 
They are “inputs” of the production process. They can serve as “collateral,” at least for bank borrowing. 
They can be resold to other firms through the secondary market. And as we argue in the paper, since 
corporate real estate tend to appreciate in value (especially in China), and machines tend to depreciate 
over time, the importance of corporate real estate in the “fixed asset holding” will increase over time. 
Recently, Jin et al (2010) also use “corporate real estate” as a proxy for “fixed asset holding” and find 
that it is very important in explaining both the business cycle dynamics as well as housing market 
This paper attempts to shed light on several research questions. First, does fixed asset 
investment enhance (or damage) the performance of firms? For instance, if a higher share of fixed 
asset investment is found to be associated with a lower level of performance or with efficiency 
measures, then it would be consistent with the “over-investing” theory. Second, this paper will 
study the determinants of fixed asset investment in Chinese firms. For instance, is the behavior of 
Chinese firms consistent with the pattern previously reported in the literature, based on data from 
the United States? Does a particular institutional setting (such as state-ownership) or policy (such 
as tax policy) play a role? This paper attempts to shed light on these questions. 
There are several additional benefits to the study of fixed asset investment. First, relative to 
investment in research and development, investment in fixed assets is easier to measure. It is also 
easier to compare across firms from different sectors. While Cooper (2006), among others, 
suggests that China will continue to experience an investment boom, our firm-level approach 
should help us to assess whether particular kinds of firms tend to invest more than others. 
Moreover, fixed asset investment also seems to be a very important component of the total 
investment of a typical firm in China.  
In addition, it may be related to the macroeconomic activities. As corporate real estate (CRE) 
typically constitutes a significant share of the “fixed asset investment,” and real estate can serve as 
collateral for bank lending, the fluctuation of real estate prices have the potential to influence the 
lending capacity of corporate and hence the macroeconomic activities, as demonstrated recently 
by Jin et al. (2010). Thus, this study of CRE may also contribute to our understanding of the 
borrowing behavior of Chinese firms. Even though investment data are not accessible to us, as 
China has not yet adopted the “mark-to-the-market” principle in accounting, the asset holding data 
could well reflect the investment pattern of different firms, thus analysis of these data would still 
shed light on the relevant issues. 
 
2. Why hold fixed assets? 
Standard economic theory would suggest that whether a person rents or owns does not matter, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
dynamics. Thus, using CRE and “fixed asset holding” interchangeably may be a compromise given the 
data limitation. 
 
as long as the capital market is perfect. However, if the capital market is imperfect, which may 
indeed be the case in China, firms may prefer to rent rather than own a fixed asset because they 
may prefer to maintain some level of cash flow to self-insure against possible liquidity risk in the 
future.3 Thus, firms with growth opportunities or facing severe financial constraints may prefer to 
rent rather than own fixed assets. 
On the other hand, there are also reasons why companies may prefer to hold fixed assets. 
First, a rental market may not yet be established, hence firms are forced to own certain assets (for 
instance, special machinery) if they need to employ them. In addition, there is a tax advantage. 
Investment in fixed assets can be tax-exempted. To encourage economic growth, the Chinese 
government published “The contemporary law for tax adjustment of the fixed-asset 
investment in different industries in China” in 1999. This law gives a lower value-added tax 
rate for certain industries (such as manufacturing, petroleum, cars, agriculture, technology 
innovation, shipping, metallurgy, etc.) that are perceived to play an important role in 
economic growth. Some fixed-asset investment items from these industries are subject to 
only 5%, or even 0% tax, while comparable investment in other industries would be subject 
to 50% tax.  
The demand for fixed asset holding may also be driven by the production mode. Some 
industries, such as manufacturing, may prefer to hold more fixed assets. Moreover, very few 
Chinese listed companies distribute dividends, which enable them to invest even more. Finally, in 
the Chinese stock market, many listed companies have high state-ownership. Historically, 
state-owned firms are perceived to be more likely to acquire fixed assets. This perception is 
consistent with the results of Blanchard (2006). Later on, we will examine whether this impression 
is still true in our data.  
Another reason may be related to the recent boom in the real estate market in China. For 
instance, Peng et al. (2008) find that “the property price index for Shanghai increased by an 
average of about 13% per annum in 2001–2004.” Figure 2 displays the ratio of house prices 
relative to GDP. It shows that, at the national level, house prices have increased at least as fast as 
GDP. In other words, real estate investment can be a good “hedge.” Thus, some firms may have 
                                                              
3  Among others, see Gorton (2010) for more discussion on this. 
an incentive to acquire real estate as part of their fixed asset investment.4 5 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Following recent Chinese researches which focus on the micro data, this paper also 
concentrate the efforts on corporate level data.6 The data used in this study were collected from 
the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR), which is based on the 
annual reports and employed by several recent researches. Our sample consists of companies 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges throughout the years 2003 to 2007. Because 
the annual reports of listed firms are usually audited by world-renowned accounting agencies, the 
data used in this paper carry some credibility.7 Missing annual reports and missing observations in 
the CSMAR Database reduce the sample size. Also, one firm with negative assets is dropped from 
the sample. Therefore, our full sample consists of 1218 companies and 5512 firm-year 
observations. Subsample 1 contains 4625 observations, which are firms with positive profit only, 
and subsample 2 contains 3978 observations, which are firms with positive efficiency only. The 
detailed definitions are provided in Table 1. It is clear that by construction, firms with positive 
efficiency will have positive profit in the first place.  
(Table 1 about here) 
We have collected information on the fixed asset holding, debt ratio, sales (income), 
profit/total assets, state-ownership, salary of senior manager/income, dividend, CEO/Chairman, 
industries, etc. These variables are included for sound economic reasons. As Du et al. (2007) 
explained in detail, managers may not invest to maximize the return for investors, but might 
                                                              
4  Throughout this paper, we will use the term “properties” and “real estate” interchangeably. 
Henceforth, we will also abuse the vocabulary slightly to assume that “real estate” includes both 
“buildings” and “land.” 
5 Needless to say, if most firms attempt to buy real estate now to hedge the risk of even higher prices in 
the future, it may lead to a self-fulfilling price increase in real estate. This paper focuses on the firm 
level analysis and leaves this question for future research. For an analysis of the China housing markets, 
see Leung and Wang (2007), Leung et al (2010), Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2010), among others. 
6 Allen et al (2005), Calomiris et al (2010), Cull and Xu (2005), Fan et al (2007), Firth et al (2006), 
Gul et al (2010), Jiang et al (201), among others. The data source of our paper and theirs are very 
similar, and in some cases exactly identical. 
7 The accounting year for listed firms in China is from January 1 to December 31. Foreign firms are 
not subject to this rule, and they are excluded from our sample. Thus, all firms in our sample have the 
same accounting year, which facilitates the comparison. 
instead use investment for private benefit, including “empire building’’ or other private motives. 
Thus, it is necessary to include some corporate governance variables in the firm-level empirical 
analyses. The rationale is simple. If the senior management has only minor share ownership, the 
private cost of their inefficient investment may be small. Similarly, if firms are cash-constrained or 
reserving cash for other investments, they may be less willing to buy corporate real estate. 
However, firms may be able to finance their real estate investment through long-term debt, as the 
real estate can be used as collateral. As a result, we would expect a positive association between 
the holding of corporate real estate and long-term debt holding. Due to space limitations, we refer 
interested readers to Du et al. for a more extensive discussion and literature review. 
We will first present some summary statistics to provide an overview of the dataset; these 
are shown in Table 2a.8 To establish the robustness of our results, note that we have three samples: 
the full sample, sub-sample 1, and sub-sample 2. For most variables, such as the CDs, CDR, Debt, 
Dual, Jensen-alpha, etc., there are very few changes across different samples. Needless to say, 
there are exceptions. For the efficiency variable, once we restrict our attention to firms with 
positive efficiency, the mean is much closer to zero, and the standard deviation shrinks 
dramatically from 776 (full sample) to 53 (sub-sample 2). The EPS variable (the net profit per unit 
of share) increases from about 0.23 (full sample) to about 0.46 (sub-sample 2). Table 2b also 
summarizes the expected sign of different variables in the Jensen alpha regression. 
 
 (Table 2a, b about here) 
 
It may be instructive to recall our research questions:  
(1) Do firms in China “over-invest” in their fixed asset investment (FAH)? Are the 
risk-adjusted performances of firms affected by the FAH? 
(2) Does the tax-favor policy lead to more FAH in the target industries? 
(3) What are the other determinants of FAH in Chinese firms? 
To approach the corporate real estate problem, as Du et al. (2007) explained, some 
                                                              
8 In the original sample, there is one firm which shows negative assets. Because it is not clear how to 
interpret this, we simply remove that firm from the sample and find that the summary statistics are 
virtually unchanged.   
econometric issues need to be resolved. Clearly, since this dataset includes all listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market over a period with significant economic development in China, serious 
heterogeneity issues may arise. In particular, the firm-fixed effect and time-specific effect may be 
present in the dataset. Ignoring their presence may lead to significant bias, as explained in Hsiao 
(2003). Recently, Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (2008) show that through a data transformation, it is 
possible to “eliminate” both the firm-fixed effect and time-specific effect and obtain an unbiased 
estimator. To our knowledge, this is the first study which employs this new technique in panel data 
method. Therefore, some additional details are presented in appendix I. We will present econometric 
data based on the original data and the “adjusted data.”  
Another issue is endogeneity and causality. It may be that firms that are inefficient, or 
managers who are uncompetitive, choose to invest heavily in real estate, as their opportunity costs 
are arguably lower. It may also be the other way round: previous heavy investment in corporate 
real estate may constrain firms to make more profitable investments. Because the real estate 
market is relatively illiquid, firms may be “trapped” in past “mistakes” in over-investment in real 
estate. However, as the time span of our data is relatively short, it is unlikely that our data set 
would be able to resolve this causality question. To remain neutral on this issue, we adopt a Probit 
model, which only indicates the likelihood of certain phenomena occurring, given a particular set 
of variables. As a comparison, we also ran an OLS regression; however, as the results are similar, 
and OLS may be subject to more econometric doubts, we will present only the results from the 
Probit model. In the text, we will mainly present the results with all firms included. In the 
appendix II, which will be available upon request, we remove all “real estate firms” and re-run all 
the regressions.9 We find that the results are indeed very similar. Thus, we will focus on the 
discussion on the “all firm case” in the text. 
Except for the “data adjustment,” our econometric strategy is fairly standard, to facilitate 
comparison with the literature. To address research questions (1) and (2), we follow the finance 
literature in using Jensen’s alpha as a measure of risk-adjusted measure of performance. Table 3 
presents the Probit model for the firm-level Jensen-alpha across different samples. Clearly, other 
things being equal, a higher share of FAH in the total asset is associated with a lower value of 
                                                              
9  The full version of this paper will be available from IDEAS, http://ideas.repec.org/ 
 
Jensen-alpha (statistically significant in 5 of the 6 cases considered). In other words, it seems that 
investment in more fixed assets does adversely affect the performance of corporations in China. 
Moreover, we find that the tax-favor industry dummy is associated with a lower value of 
Jensen-alpha (statistically significant in 5 of the 6 cases considered). Thus, the tax policy does not 
seem to bring any immediate benefits to the shareholders. Furthermore, in four out of the six cases, 
a higher level of overhead expenses (OE) is associated with a lower level of Jensen-alpha, which 
seems to be consistent with the agency theory, as higher levels of OE often means higher levels of 
subsidy to the senior management.10  
(Table 3a about here) 
 
While these variables show a consistent pattern in their relationship with corporate 
performance, this is not the case for some other variables. For instance, with the original data, a 
higher level of state-ownership is always associated with a higher Jensen-alpha, which makes 
state-ownership a positive factor. However, after the firm-fixed effect and time-specific effect are 
taken into consideration, a higher level of state-ownership is always associated with a lower 
Jensen-alpha, which makes state-ownership a negative factor. Similarly, the coefficients of the 
cash dividend dummy are always statistically significantly and positive in the Jensen-alpha 
regression with the original data. However, it is consistently statistically significant and negative 
after the firm-fixed effect and specific-time effect are taken into consideration. The same 
phenomenon also occurs in the case of CR, which measures ownership concentration by the 
proportion of shares held by the top 10 shareholders. With the original data, the coefficients are 
always statistically significant and positive, suggesting that a higher concentration of ownership 
will enhance the risk-adjusted measure of performance of corporations. However, after adjusting 
for the firm-fixed effect and specific-time effect, the coefficients are always statistically 
significantly and negative, suggesting that a higher concentration of ownership actually depresses 
the risk-adjusted performance for firms in China. 
                                                              
10  Senior managers in China, especially in state-owned enterprises, do not usually receive high salaries.  
Nonetheless, their private expenses, such as meals, transportation, holidays, and shopping, can be 
covered by company expenses. Thus, overhead expenses (OE) can be interpreted as the hidden 
income of senior managers. In Chinese academic circles, it is often regarded as a proxy for 
management cost. High OE will lead to a lower level of efficiency. 
To provide a tentative summary, these results seem to suggest that, while the level of 
state-ownership, the dividend policy of firms, and the concentration of ownership are all important 
factors, their effects may not be as robust as some previous authors thought. This may also be 
related to our interpretation of the firm-fixed and specific-time effects. Nonetheless, these results 
may also justify why we should focus on the holding of fixed asset investments and the tax-favor 
policy, which seem to give more robust results. Because the main focus of this paper is on fixed 
asset investment, we simply present these results and leave further exploration to future research.  
Thus far, we have followed the literature and pooled the firms listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen markets together. However, it is possible that the firms listed on the two markets are 
different. For instance, very large Chinese firms tend to be listed on the Shanghai rather than 
Shenzhen market. Some people argue that the liquidity in the Shanghai market is higher, while 
others argue that firms are listed on the Shanghai market only if they have certain connections. For 
our purposes, it is sufficient to test whether the listing decision may affect the risk-adjusted  
performance of firms. Therefore, we introduce one more dummy variable, SH, which takes the 
value of one if the firm is listed in Shanghai, and zero if it is listed in Shenzhen. We re-run the 
regression and the results can be found in the appendix II, which will be available upon request. 
Most results are preserved with a few notable differences. First, after controlling for the firm-fixed 
effect and specific-time effect, the coefficients for DUAL (which takes the value of one when the 
Chairman of the company and the CEO are the same person, and zero otherwise) are statistically 
significant and negative. This is consistent with Du et al. (2008), who found that better corporate 
governance (which in this case means the Chairman and CEO are a different person) will improve 
the risk-adjusted performance of firms. In addition, other things being equal, the coefficients of 
the Shanghai dummy are always statistically significant and negative. This is consistent with the 
conjecture that the Shanghai market provides a higher level of liquidity, and hence investors 
would accept a lower return. It is also possible that being listed on the Shanghai market may incur 
additional costs to the firm (such as a financial contribution from the firm to Shanghai city, or the 
need to provide more subsidies to senior managers in the form of “overhead expenses” etc.), 
leading to a lower Jensen-alpha value. Since our focus is on fixed asset holding, it is sufficient for 
us to know that the introduction of the Shanghai dummy does not affect our principal results, and 
we will leave the explanation of the negative coefficient for future research. 
 It may be argued that Jensen’s alpha is the not the most appropriate measure. Jensen’s 
alpha is a risk-adjusted measure of firm performance, while we may be more interested in the 
investment risk, which is measured by the “Beta.” To address this concern, we repeat our analysis, 
with Jensen’s alpha replaced by “Beta risk.” Table 3b reports the results of the baseline cases. 
Results when the Shanghai-listing dummy is included can be found in the appendix II. It is clear 
that FAH (fixed asset investment) is statistically and negatively related to the beta, meaning that 
an increase in the proportion of fixed assets to total assets is associated with a decrease in the 
systematic risk (which is Beta). However, after controlling for the time and firm-fixed effect, the 
statistical significance disappears. It seems that there are important idiosyncratic factors which 
affect firm performance.  
 
(Table 3b about here) 
To address research question (3), we run another Probit regression and present the results 
in Table 4. Because real estate and other fixed assets are typically illiquid, it is not surprising that 
FAH for the previous period is a very consistent predictor of FAH for the current period. The 
statistical significance and positivity of the coefficients across all six samples are in some ways 
expected. Once again, the coefficients of the tax-favor policy dummy are statistically significant 
and positive across all six samples. Combined with the results from the previous table, this means 
that the tax-favor policy encourages those industries to invest more in fixed assets, which on its 
own tends to be associated with lower levels of risk-adjusted measure of firm performance. In 
addition, even controlling for the effect of FAH, the tax-favor policy exerts a direct and negative 
effect on the Jensen’s Alpha. Thus, the tax-favor policy suppresses the firm performance both 
directly and indirectly.  
For other variables, the results do not seem to be as clear. For instance, the coefficients 
of DEBT are statistically significant and positive for the original data, meaning that a higher debt 
ratio relative to total assets is associated with a higher ratio of fixed asset investment relative to 
total assets. However, after the firm-fixed effect and specific-time effect are taken into 
consideration, the coefficients become negative and statistically significant. Similarly, the 
coefficients of STO are statistically significant and positive for the original data, meaning that a 
higher level of state ownership is associated with a higher proportion of fixed asset investment 
relative to total assets. However, once the firm-fixed effect and specific-time effect are adjusted 
for, the coefficients become negative and the statistical significance is unfortunately lost. Other 
variables that fail to deliver robust results include ROA (the amount of profit for each unit of 
asset), MSR, and CD (the cash dividend dummy). In the appendix, we provide supplementary 
regressions and the qualitative results seem to be unaffected. The most consistent (and positive) 
factors to explain fixed asset investment are the previous FAH (which only confirms the 
persistence of FAH) and the tax-favor-policy. Other variables are still subject to changing sign or 
even the disappearance of statistical significance. It suffices to say that further research is needed 
to gain a better understanding of the determinants of FAH. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
To examine the possibility that the firms listed in Shanghai are intrinsically different from 
those listed in Shenzhen, we again introduce the Shanghai dummy and re-run the regression. As 
shown in the appendix II, the qualitative results are the same as in Table 4a (without the Shanghai 
dummy). In fact, the Shanghai dummy is never statistically significant. This suggests that listing 
in Shanghai per se does not affect fixed asset investment behavior. If the risk-adjusted measure of 
firm performance is indeed affected, it must be through some other channel. Again, we contend 
that the listing decision does not affect fixed asset holding and leave other issues for future 
research. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper is motivated by the over-investment theory (or, over-investment debate), which 
attempts to explain the phenomenal economic growth of China. Our data set spans the period 2003 
to 2007, and covers more than 1,000 listed firms in China. Our principal findings are that,:(1) a 
higher proportion of fixed asset investment is associated with a lower level of Jensen’s alpha, 
suggesting that corporate real estate and other types of fixed asset investment may not enhance 
firm performance in the stock market after adjusting for risk; (2) the industries that are favored by 
“The contemporary law for tax adjustment of the fixed-asset investment in different 
industries in China” issued in 1999, are associated with a lower Jensen’s alpha, suggesting 
that the law may potentially damage firm performance (after adjusting for the risk); (3) the 
previous period FAH and the tax-favor industry dummy are the only robust determinants of 
the current period fixed asset holding (FAH), indicating that industries are favored by the law 
mentioned previously. Clearly, (1) is consistent with the findings of Du et al. (2008), which 
were based on U.S. data, while (2) and (3) together seem to confirm the conventional wisdom 
in the public finance literature that tax favors may do more harm than good, at least in the 
financial market. The law does encourage fixed asset investment, but an increase in fixed 
asset investment does not deliver better performance at the firm level (after adjusting for 
risk). 
The result reported in the previous literature, suggesting that state-ownership of firms 
may encourage FAH and dampen risk-adjusted firm performance, is only partially confirmed 
in this updated dataset. It seems that whether or not the firm-fixed effect and specific-time 
effect are corrected for will crucially affect the results. Other variables, including the 
dividend policy of firms, the concentration of ownership, and the managerial proportion of share 
holdings, all suffer from the same issue. In other words, an increase in the proportion of fixed 
asset investments need not be associated with a decrease in the risk-adjusted firm performance. 
We are aware that our results are at odds with some of the earlier literature on Chinese corporate 
investment. This may be because we are using more up-to-date data. It may also be due to the fact 
that our econometric strategy, which is based on the recent work of Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu 2008, 
allows us to take into consideration both the firm-fixed effect and time-specific effect 
simultaneously. Clearly, more research is needed to clarify this. 
To deepen our understanding of corporate investment, it would be helpful to conduct a 
cross-country comparison. Theoretical work would also be instructive. Some of these ideas are 
currently being pursued.
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Real GDP in China from 2000 to 2007 (in Billion RMB) 
 
 
Note that the Year 2000 is calculated as the base year.  
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 
 
 
Figure 2. Housing Price Index/ GDP Index in China from 2000 to 2007 
 
 
Data Source: online dataset of the National Bureau of Statistics of China; 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/  
Note that Both the Housing Price Index and GDP index are nominal indexes.  
.  
TABLES: 
Table 1.  List of Variables 
Variable name Explanation 
CDs Cash dividend (dummy variable 0=no dividend, 1=dividend) 
CR Percent of shares held by top 10 shareholders/total shares 
DEBT Debt/total asset 
DUAL 1= CEO and Chairman are the same person; otherwise 0. 
EFFICIENCY  (profit-depreciation-tax + interest payment)/ 
(fixed asset holding + inventory) 
EPS Net profit divided by total shares 
FAH Fixed assets/total assets 
JENSEN ALFA Jensen's alpha = Portfolio Return - [Risk Free Rate + Portfolio 
Beta * (Market Return - Risk Free Rate)] 
LNPAY LNPAY = Ln (total annual remuneration of current board of 
directors and senior managers) 
MSR Managerial shares/total shares 
OE Overhead expenses 
ROA Return of asset = profit/total asset 
SH SH=1 if the firm is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
SH=0 if the firm is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
SIZE Size = Ln (asset) 
STO State owned shares/total shares 
TAXFAVOR TAXFAVOR=1 if this industry has received a special tax favor 
on investment, 0 otherwise. The tax favor is applied to industries 
such as manufacturing, petroleum, cars, agriculture, 
technology innovation, shipping, and metallurgy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2a.  Summary Statistics 
 
Full sample  
 
(No. of Obs. = 
5512) 
Subsample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit)  
 
(No. of Obs. = 
4625) 
Subsample 2  
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
 
(No. of Obs. = 
3978) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
CDS .3512337 .4773991 .3496216 .476902 .3944193 .488787 
CR 58.03741 13.92745 57.93693 13.91901 58.3164 13.9843 
DEBT .0724802 .1138099 .0724066 .1077405 .0727111 .0962747 
DUAL .1139332 .3177599 .1161081 .3203892 .1128708 .3164746 
EFFICI 
-ENCY 
-10.28485 776.8082 -12.2621 848.026 1.077584 53.14381 
EPS .2278429 3.212522 .2714032 2.458388 .4588386 2.412534 
FAH .3145689 .1878599 .3163736 .1885543 .3147734 .1894271 
JENSEN 
ALPHA 
-.0235673 .0265477 -.0233436 .0246684 -.0228784 .0260667 
LNPAY 14.005 .8578241 14.00087 .8586776 14.08471 .8351003 
MSR .0001087 .0013332 .0001185 .0014522 .0001287 .0015637 
OE 18.10016 1.078647 18.09175 1.067724 18.08334 1.065607 
ROA -.3739496 28.91251 -.4475944 31.56331 .0529499 .5772647 
SIZE 21.3172 1.07632 21.30929 1.066255 21.40118 1.031131 
SH .6139332 .4868904 .6004324 .4898624 .6136249 .4869795 
STO .3255011 .246879 .3241886 .2463527 .3298115 .2469107 
TAX 
FAVOR 
.6373367 .4808124 .6402162 .4799888 .6420312 .4794632 
 
Table 2b. Expected Sign of different variables on the Jensen’s Alpha Regression 
Variables Expected Sign 
FAH 
Negative if firms over-invest;  
Positive if tax-advantage effect dominates  
STO 
Negative if state-owned firms are inefficient; 
Positive if state-owned firms have competitive advantage  
CDS 
Positive if dividend-paying signals the profitability of the firm; 
Negative if non-dividend-paying signals good growth opportunities and there is a significant 
external finance premium  
DUAL Positive if un-monitored managers tend to over-invest  
MSR Positive if managers have private incentive to over-invest  
OE Negative if managers over-compensate themselves 
CR Positive if the major shareholders solve the free-rider problem in corporate governance 
SIZE 
Negative if the firm exhibits diminishing marginal returns to scale; 
Insignificant if the firm exhibits constant returns to scale 
TAXFAVOR 
Positive if the tax-favor policy enhance the performance; 
Negative if the tax-favor policy encourage over-investment 
_CONS (theories do not provide any prediction on the intercept term) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3a.  Jensen’s alpha and FAH11 
(all firms included) 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
JENSEN 
ALPHA 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.163898* -.1778505* -.0537834 -4.61e-08*** -4.13e-08*** -4.16e-08*** 
STO .3557752*** .319256*** .3114815*** -.012302*** -.0100149*** -.0101054*** 
CDS .5520284*** .5244555*** .4379631*** -.4192785*** -.406408*** -.4684545*** 
DUAL -.0119715 .0037015 .0522378 -.2009325*** -.1793014*** -.2206937*** 
MSR 14.16026 13.43497 10.34369 -.7778318*** -.8047145*** -.6931924*** 
OE -.0489703** -.0582657** .0441247 -.0343929** -.0313704** .0079563 
CR .0137678*** .0131211*** .0132469*** -.0069947*** -.0056688*** -.006745*** 
SIZE .0015995 .0135847 -.0695877** .0341305* .0268192 .013374 
TAXFAVOR -.0954043*** -.1321726*** -.1698788*** -.0406806 -.0756741* -.0990798** 
_CONS -.0481067 -.0727276* -.1658069 -.639573** -.4747125 -.7852838** 
2R   0.0613 0.0561 0.0495 0.0310 0.0293 0.0309 
Number of obs.   5512  4625 3978 5512 4625 3978 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
                                                              
11  This table provides the results for whether a higher level of fixed asset holding leads to a lower level 
of risk‐adjusted performance of firms. 
 Table 3b.  Beta risk and FAH12 
(all firms included) 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.4255677*** -.3642361*** -.392987*** 2.18e-09 1.14e-10 -3.25e-09 
CDS .4993897*** .5193864*** .5541423*** -.0087488*** -.0076805*** -.0058359*** 
CR .1176989*** .1438711*** .1873342*** -.2682122*** -.2777139*** -.278463*** 
DUAL -.1614423*** -.1687806*** -.1711631*** -.2421135*** -.2788603*** -.3128901*** 
MSR -4.304198 -4.823651 -1.683752 -.1645115** -.1647322** -.2811378*** 
OE .0067303 .0120698 -.0795636*** .0055014 .0031437 -.0213946 
SIZE .0055279*** .0048857*** .0043481*** -.0099774*** -.0095362*** -.0083438*** 
STO -.0341947 -.0573121** .0132534 .0404164** .027638 .0364093 
TAXFAVOR .0161199 .0069503 .0425231 .0416346 .0441332 .0688012 
_CONS .3169 .7394963 .8314517 -.9243672*** -.5598455* -.3545901 
2R  0.0183 0.0187 0.0222 0.0121 0.0119 0.0122 
Number of 
obs. 
5512 4625 3978 5512  4625 3978 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
                                                              
12  This table provides the results for whether a higher level of fixed asset holding leads to a lower level 
of beta risk for firms. 
Table 4.  Determinants of FAH13 
(all firms included) 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.363007*** 2.37265*** 2.480684*** 2.386947*** 2.387394*** 2.471456*** 
DEBT 2.779517*** 2.824479*** 3.332848*** -.0771508*** -.1034453*** -.1235553*** 
ROA .0015126 .0016081 -1.898716* .0323866 .0428799* .0771072** 
MSR -11.40781 38.62567 44.88193* -.062224 .11021 .0352122 
CDS .097039* .0900744 .2251664*** -.0714108 .0093584 .0554001 
CR .0000812 .0001766 .0002307 -.0046531 -.0039951 -.0044184 
TAXFAVOR .2856874*** .2713558*** .2750976*** .2952355*** .2905104*** .3006526*** 
STO .589395*** .6358339*** .5885134*** -.0065187 -.005776 -.0047251 
_CONS -1.894962*** -1.916912*** -2.036388*** -3.27983*** -3.78276*** -4.279727*** 
2R  0.5174 0.5162 0.5505 0.4951 0.4936 0.5218 
Number of 
obs. 
3907  2763 2132 3907 2763 2132 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
                                                              
13  This table provides the results for how the level of fixed asset holding of firms are related to some 
corporate level variables, such as the whether the firm pays dividend, the amount of debt of the firm, 
whether the firm belongs to tax‐favored industries, etc.   
 
Appendix IA: Data transformation to overcome both the firm‐fixed effect and the 
time‐specific effect 
 
The exposition here mainly follows Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (2008).   
Suppose that the data‐generating process is captured by the following equation (*) 
 
, 1it i t i t it ity y X          
 
Where  itX   is a vector of explanatory variables,  i   and  t   are the (unobservable) firm‐fixed 
effect and the time‐specific effect respectively. 
 
Now  we  need  a  few  definitions.  For  any  variable  itz ,  define  the  time‐average  of  itz   as 
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From (*), we can take the cross‐sectional average of the whole equation and get (*1) 
 
tttt
N
i
itt XyyN
y  

 

 1
1
1
 
 
Where  


N
i
iN 1
1  ,    

 
N
i
tit yN
y
1
1,1
1
,  


N
i
itt XN
X
1
1
,  


N
i
itt N 1
1   
 
Similarly, we can take the time average of the whole equation and get (*2) 
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Finally, we can take both the time and cross‐sectional average of the equation (*) and get (*3) 
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Then, if we subtract (*1) and (*2) from (*), and add back (*3), we get (**). 
    
   


 
tiittiit
tititiit
XXXX
yyyyyyyy 111,1,
  , 
 
Which is in the form   
tttt    1 . 
Notice that both the firm‐fixed effect  i , and the time‐specific effect  t   are eliminated.     
Moreover, we observe that  , ,t t t     are all serially correlated, and   
   0, 0,t t t tE E       
 
which implies that the OLS estimate of (**) will be biased. We will instead use GLS for (**) and 
the Probit. 
 
Appendix IB: Summary statistics by industry 
 
Table B7:  Summary statistics by industry 
 
No. of 
firms 
Avg. size 
(real value) 
Skewness 
of size  
Avg.FAH 
Avg. State 
ownership 
Jensen’s 
Alpha 
X1 agriculture 120 1.64e+09 1.200635 0.255079 .3360117 ‐0.02391
X2 mining 
industry 
81 3.50e+10   3.828829 0.461056 .4792746 ‐0.01892
X3 
manufacture 
3182 2.99e+09 12.19938 0.320415 .3407569 ‐0.02252
X4 energy 249 7.40e+09 4.550773 0.525603 .4120958 ‐0.02448
X5 construction 107 3.75e+09 2.196678 0.196786 .4252596 ‐0.02456
X6 
transportation, 
warehousing 
241 6.82e+09 3.690077 0.504383 .4105065 ‐0.02229
X7 
communication 
346 3.11e+09 9.63609 0.171273 .2201142 ‐0.02437
X8 whole sale 
and retail 
business 
403 2.29e+09 4.931087 0.327243 .2956939 ‐0.02513
X9 financial 
firms 
18 1.02e+09 1.468129 0.329371   .383003 0.027178
X10 real estate 236 3.75e+09 9.447016 0.105312 .2610726 ‐0.02148
X11 service 165 2.75e+09 1.483072 0.389084 .3491345 ‐0.02264
X12 IT and 
entertaining  
43 1.54e+09   1.38333 0.326644 .2083465 ‐0.02329
 
Additional Appendices for Dong Leung and Cai, “What Drives Fixed Asset Holding 
and Risk-Adjusted Performance of Corporate in China? An Empirical Analysis”  
 
 
APPENDIX II: Full set of Results   
In  the  text,  due  to  the  space  limit, we  are  unable  to  present  all  the  results.  This 
appendix provides all the details for different robustness checks. 
 
Table 1.  List of Variables 
Variable name Explanation 
CDs Cash dividend (dummy variable 0=no dividend, 1=dividend) 
CR Percent of shares held by top 10 shareholders/total shares 
DEBT Debt/total asset 
DUAL 1= CEO and Chairman are the same person; otherwise 0. 
EFFICIENCY  (profit-depreciation-tax + interest payment)/ 
(fixed asset holding + inventory) 
EPS Net profit divided by total shares 
FAH Fixed assets/total assets 
JENSEN ALFA Jensen's alpha = Portfolio Return - [Risk Free Rate + Portfolio 
Beta * (Market Return - Risk Free Rate)] 
LNPAY LNPAY = Ln (total annual remuneration of current board of 
directors and senior managers) 
MSR Managerial shares/total shares 
OE Overhead expenses 
ROA Return of asset = profit/total asset 
SH SH=1 if the firm is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
SH=0 if the firm is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
SIZE Size = Ln (asset) 
STO State owned shares/total shares 
TAXFAVOR TAXFAVOR=1 if this industry has received a special tax favor 
on investment, 0 otherwise. The tax favor is applied to industries 
such as manufacturing, petroleum, cars, agriculture, 
technology innovation, shipping, and metallurgy. 
 
 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics 
 Full sample (No. of Observations 5512) 
Subsample 1 (firms with positive profit) 
(No. of Observations 4625) 
Subsample 2 (firms with positive 
efficiency) 
(No. of Observations 3978) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CDS .3512337 .4773991 0 1 .3496216 .476902 0 1 .3944193 .488787 0 1 
CR 58.03741 13.92745 2.08 99.48 57.93693 13.91901 2.08 99.48 58.3164 13.9843 2.08 99.48 
DEBT .0724802 .1138099 -.0004037 3.092443 .0724066 .1077405 -.0004037 2.32 .0727111 .0962747 -.0004037 .7916724
DUAL .1139332 .3177599 0 1 .1161081 .3203892 0 1 .1128708 .3164746 0 1 
EFFICI 
-ENCY 
-10.28485 776.8082 -57500.99 3324.576 -12.2621 848.026 -57500.99 3324.576 1.077584 53.14381 .000086 3324.576
EPS .2278429 3.212522 -164.78 85.95 .2714032 2.458388 -45.47 85.95 .4588386 2.412534 -2.31 85.95 
FAH .3145689 .1878599 -.206255 .9564393 .3163736 .1885543 -.206255 .9564393 .3147734 .1894271 -.206255 .9564393
JENSEN 
ALPHA 
-.0235673 .0265477 -1.019917 .9487192 -.0233436 .0246684 -1.019917 .9487192 -.0228784 .0260667 -1.019917 .9487192
LNPAY 14.005 .8578241 10.26813 18.98911 14.00087 .8586776 10.26813 18.98911 14.08471 .8351003 10.4631 18.98911
MSR .0001087 .0013332 0 .0776536 .0001185 .0014522 0 .0776536 .0001287 .0015637 0 .0776536
OE 18.10016 1.078647 13.78415 24.30578 18.09175 1.067724 13.78415 24.30578 18.08334 1.065607 13.78415 24.30578
ROA -.3739496 28.91251 -2146.161 36.09082 -.4475944 31.56331 -2146.161 36.09082 .0529499 .5772647 .0000611 36.09082
SIZE 21.3172 1.07632 12.31425 27.30053 21.30929 1.066255 12.31425 27.30053 21.40118 1.031131 14.47972 27.30053
SH .6139332 .4868904 0 1 .6004324 .4898624 0 1 .6136249 .4869795 0 1 
STO .3255011 .246879 0 .85 .3241886 .2463527 0 .85 .3298115 .2469107 0 .85 
TAX 
FAVOR 
.6373367 .4808124 0 1 .6402162 .4799888 0 1 .6420312 .4794632 0 1 
 
Table 3a.  Jensen’s alpha and FAH 
Panel 1: all firms included 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
JENSEN 
ALPHA 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.163898* -.1778505* -.0537834 -4.61e-08*** -4.13e-08*** -4.16e-08*** 
STO .3557752*** .319256*** .3114815*** -.012302*** -.0100149*** -.0101054*** 
CDS .5520284*** .5244555*** .4379631*** -.4192785*** -.406408*** -.4684545*** 
DUAL -.0119715 .0037015 .0522378 -.2009325*** -.1793014*** -.2206937*** 
MSR 14.16026 13.43497 10.34369 -.7778318*** -.8047145*** -.6931924*** 
OE -.0489703** -.0582657** .0441247 -.0343929** -.0313704** .0079563 
CR .0137678*** .0131211*** .0132469*** -.0069947*** -.0056688*** -.006745*** 
SIZE .0015995 .0135847 -.0695877** .0341305* .0268192 .013374 
TAXFAVOR -.0954043*** -.1321726*** -.1698788*** -.0406806 -.0756741* -.0990798** 
_CONS -.0481067 -.0727276* -.1658069 -.639573** -.4747125 -.7852838** 
2R   0.0613 0.0561 0.0495 0.0310 0.0293 0.0309 
Number of obs.   5512  4625 3978 5512 4625 3978 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
JENSEN 
ALPHA 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.1032442 -.0774855 .0069221 -3.99e-08*** -3.24e-08*** -2.74e-08** 
STO .3510178*** .3222243*** .3242315*** -.0128749*** -.0110138*** -.0104687*** 
CDS .5431654*** .5331583*** .4794498*** -.4098599*** -.4133346*** -.4774616*** 
DUAL -.0200957 -.0009508 .0280191 -.2088788*** -.212526*** -.2285033*** 
MSR 14.08645 13.81102 11.87924 -.7673108*** -.8174016*** -.7014263*** 
OE -.0374122 -.0557001** .0350816 -.0281317* -.0208429 .0189343 
CR .014218*** .0138907*** .0147368*** -.007348*** -.0058883*** -.0062618*** 
SIZE -.0166127 -.0035368 -.1059512*** .0253652 .0154639 -.0044069 
TAXFAVOR -.0711599* -.113134*** -.1238203*** -.0209044 -.0584339 -.0652635 
_CONS .0648752 .1610174 .7144428 -.5928217* -.4602045 -.5516316 
2R  0.0607 0.0583 0.0574 0.0288 0.0279 0.0277 
Number of obs. 5276 4430 3802 5276 4430 3802 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 3b.  Jensen’s alpha and FAH (with SH dummy) 
Panel 1: all firms included 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
JENSEN 
ALPHA 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.1733586* -.1890388* -.0695322 -4.47e-08*** -4.03e-08*** -4.05e-08*** 
STO .3467302*** .3102583*** .3001259*** -.0124606*** -.010177*** -.0103123*** 
CDS .5761716*** .5486881*** .4668418*** -.4168296*** -.4047349*** -.4681302*** 
DUAL -.0207398 -.0049829 .0430209 -.2007746*** -.1793363*** -.2209687*** 
MSR 9.916897 10.06499 6.679038 -.8178088*** -.8468049*** -.7440704*** 
OE -.0484233** -.0574054** .0465172 -.0355685** -.0324435** .007464 
CR .0142719*** .0136106*** .0139097*** -.0068777*** -.0055392*** -.0066041*** 
SIZE .0033998 .0145848 -.0706338** .0338913* .0261835 .0112576 
TAXFAVOR -.0998055*** -.1345407*** -.1737336*** -.0441515 -.0781496** -.1024548** 
SH -.147412*** -.1364402*** -.1705478*** -.0850105** -.0842352** -.0969829** 
_CONS -.0334894 -.055216 -.1196511 -.5865449* -.4192155 -.7072454* 
2R  0.0634 0.0580 0.0524 0.0317 0.0300 0.0318 
Number of 
obs. 
 5512 4625  3978 5512  4625 3978 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
profit)  
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
JENSEN 
ALPHA 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.1144359 -.0918268 -.0128298 -3.89e-08*** -3.17e-08*** -2.69e-08** 
STO .3401792*** .311481*** .3087059*** -.0130336*** -.0111768*** -.0106627*** 
CDS .5677857*** .5591373*** .5107386*** -.4074087*** -.411549*** -.4768382*** 
DUAL -.030206 -.0115418 .0155636 -.2098515*** -.2139389*** -.2305173*** 
MSR 9.993884 10.41945 8.042761 -.8103639*** -.8653437*** -.7554739*** 
OE -.0373412 -.0553669** .036755 -.0295312** -.022281 .0182402 
CR .0147255*** .0144028*** .0154487*** -.0072214*** -.005733*** -.0060893*** 
SIZE -.0143794 -.0018042 -.1058061*** .0250692 .0147706 -.0068008 
TAXFAVOR -.0770652** -.1171719*** -.1299*** -.0254648 -.0620979 -.0696535 
SH -.1487577*** -.1445982*** -.1829064*** -.0921509** -.096702** -.1050486** 
_CONS .0821605 .1789326 .7574467* -.5313535* -.3924157 -.461198 
2R  0.0629 0.0604 0.0606 0.0296 0.0288 0.0288 
Number of 
obs. 
5276 4430 3802 5276 4430 3802 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
Table 3c.  Beta risk and FAH 
Panel 1: all firms included 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.4255677*** -.3642361*** -.392987*** 2.18e-09 1.14e-10 -3.25e-09 
CDS .4993897*** .5193864*** .5541423*** -.0087488*** -.0076805*** -.0058359*** 
CR .1176989*** .1438711*** .1873342*** -.2682122*** -.2777139*** -.278463*** 
DUAL -.1614423*** -.1687806*** -.1711631*** -.2421135*** -.2788603*** -.3128901*** 
MSR -4.304198 -4.823651 -1.683752 -.1645115** -.1647322** -.2811378*** 
OE .0067303 .0120698 -.0795636*** .0055014 .0031437 -.0213946 
SIZE .0055279*** .0048857*** .0043481*** -.0099774*** -.0095362*** -.0083438*** 
STO -.0341947 -.0573121** .0132534 .0404164** .027638 .0364093 
TAXFAVOR .0161199 .0069503 .0425231 .0416346 .0441332 .0688012 
_CONS .3169 .7394963 .8314517 -.9243672*** -.5598455* -.3545901 
2R  0.0183 0.0187 0.0222 0.0121 0.0119 0.0122 
Number of 
obs. 
5512 4625 3978 5512  4625 3978 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.4091701*** -.3365842*** -.3846822*** 1.77e-09 6.67e-10 -2.99e-09 
CDS .1275354*** .14302538*** .191031*** -.2698447*** -.2763449*** -.276631*** 
CR .0059461*** .0053836*** .0048119*** -.009099*** -.0085512*** -.0075602*** 
DUAL -.1491044*** -.1451083** -.143656** -.2412015*** -.2721323*** -.3121316*** 
MSR 1.307653 .6061444 4.102146 -.1622959** -.1514305* -.2708769*** 
OE .0080844 .0168051 -.0759944** .0023907 .0016508 -.0231407 
SIZE -.0375218 -.0614264** .0108225 .0391429** .0270644 .0362341* 
STO .4696256*** .485459*** .5224956*** -.0079829*** -.0069665*** -.0053261* 
TAXFAVOR .0330759 .0258611 .0644594 .0608056 .0627097 .0940988** 
_CONS .3210264 .6925253* .772517* -.8556424*** -.5371411 -.3466064 
2R  0.0181 0.0179 0.0216 0.0115 0.0112 0.0118 
Number of 
obs. 
5276  4430  3802 5276  4430  3802 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 3d.  Beta risk and FAH (with SH dummy) 
Panel 1: all firms included 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit)
 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.4272521*** -.3658455*** -.3909135*** 1.65e-09 -4.50e-10 -4.04e-09 
STO .497605*** .5180557*** .5558667*** -.008657*** -.0075497*** -.005619** 
CDS .1220276*** .1472679*** .1835273*** -.2694208*** -.2790629*** -.2792008*** 
DUAL -.1630468*** -.1700363*** -.1699304*** -.2420616*** -.2788258*** -.3128271*** 
MSR -4.972647 -5.233358 -1.220714 -.1423799* -.1321892 -.2316171** 
OE .0068302 .0121982 -.0799187*** .0061833 .0040283 -.0208131 
CR .0056194*** .0049552*** .0042604*** -.0100385*** -.0096371*** -.0084754*** 
SIZE -.0338062 -.0571224** .0133538 .04064** .0282024 .0385892* 
TAXFAVOR .0154564 .0067095 .0429501 .0434069 .0459086 .0719184* 
SH -.0281534 -.0202496 .0241055 .0470209 .0657271* .0956199** 
_CONS .3190187 .7413445* .8258995* -.9557123*** -.6048139* -.4343475 
2R  0.0184 0.0187 0.0222 0.0123 0.0123 0.0131 
Number of 
obs. 
 5512 4625 3978  5512 4625 3978 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
Panel 2:  with SH dummy, real estate firms excluded 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit)
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.4110824*** -.3385123*** -.3824101*** 1.45e-09 4.19e-10 -3.30e-09 
CDS .1315666*** .1463356*** .1875366*** -.2710541*** -.2776266*** -.2772813*** 
CR .0060309*** .0054497*** .0047316*** -.0091596*** -.0086507*** -.0076854*** 
DUAL -.150807*** -.1465206** -.1422351** -.240593*** -.2711938*** -.3104642*** 
MSR .6749607 .2062007 4.529991 -.1395892* -.1193177 -.2236576** 
OE .0080902 .0168499 -.0761954** .0031505 .0026323 -.0224917 
SIZE -.0370731 -.0611474** .010766 .0393729** .0275866 .0383286* 
STO .467602*** .4839534 .5244457*** -.0078939*** -.0068495*** -.0051283* 
TAXFAVOR .0321868 .025415 .065089 .0631068* .0650915 .0978767** 
SH -.0260086 -.0195903 .0218558 .0485734 .0651505 .0916184** 
_CONS .3231565 .6942074* .7679661* -.8896284*** -.5837635* -.4255886 
2R  0.0182 0.0179 0.0216 0.0117 0.0116 0.0126 
Number of 
obs. 
5276  4430 3802  5512 4430 3802 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 4a.  Determinants of FAH 
Panel 1: all firms included 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.363007*** 2.37265*** 2.480684*** 2.386947*** 2.387394*** 2.471456*** 
DEBT 2.779517*** 2.824479*** 3.332848*** -.0771508*** -.1034453*** -.1235553*** 
ROA .0015126 .0016081 -1.898716* .0323866 .0428799* .0771072** 
MSR -11.40781 38.62567 44.88193* -.062224 .11021 .0352122 
CDS .097039* .0900744 .2251664*** -.0714108 .0093584 .0554001 
CR .0000812 .0001766 .0002307 -.0046531 -.0039951 -.0044184 
TAXFAVOR .2856874*** .2713558*** .2750976*** .2952355*** .2905104*** .3006526*** 
STO .589395*** .6358339*** .5885134*** -.0065187 -.005776 -.0047251 
_CONS -1.894962*** -1.916912*** -2.036388*** -3.27983*** -3.78276*** -4.279727*** 
2R  0.5174 0.5162 0.5505 0.4951 0.4936 0.5218 
Number of 
obs. 
3907  2763 2132 3907 2763 2132 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
Adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.330851*** 2.350985*** 2.455815*** 2.367411*** 2.379352*** 2.460707*** 
DEBT 3.023006*** 3.14*** 3.751931*** -.0847693*** -.1063811*** -.1363553*** 
ROA .0015055 .0016028 -1.957124* .0326731 .0383172 .0783111** 
MSR -10.59714 59.04129* 68.48328* -.0935603 .0795601 .0103174 
CDS .1003085* .0942738 .2346243*** -.0833835 -.0000364 .0469722 
CR .0003385 .0010399 .0013119 -.0043883 -.0034992 -.0045209 
TAXFAVOR .2255552*** .2030342*** .1758356** .2453466*** .2330004*** .2277695*** 
STO .5517822*** .5439574*** .5078744*** -.0058243 -.0047665 -.004753 
_CONS -1.836778*** -1.875158*** -1.990147*** -3.360705*** -3.752363*** -4.477984*** 
2R  0.5113 0.5142 0.5488 0.4869 0.4888 0.5162 
Number of 
obs. 
3744 2652 2039 3744 2652 2039 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
Table 4b.  Determinants of FAH (with SH dummy) 
 
Panel 1: all firms included 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample  
Adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.362996*** 2.373966*** 2.480867*** 2.385968*** 2.385745*** 2.469126*** 
DEBT 2.771115*** 2.801004*** 3.313612*** -.0762286*** -.1005534*** -.1197418*** 
ROA .0015281 .0016307 -1.908072* .0321631 .0422623* .0772325** 
MSR -12.06474 34.86288 42.32436* -.0780455 .0685427 -.0092932 
CDS .1024781* .0990783 .2303194*** -.0694109 .0137034 .0594438 
CR .000293 .000498 .000489 -.0042839 -.0032443 -.0038169 
TAXFAVOR .2859203*** .2759208*** .2772713*** .2948632*** .2929034*** .3016173*** 
STO .5897464*** .6375354*** .5906845*** -.0062767 -.0053736 -.0044991 
SH -.0642459 -.0983966 -.0754582 -.0368346 -.0868573 -.0861413 
_CONS -1.869784*** -1.88344*** -2.007854*** -3.24637*** -3.698829*** -4.18108*** 
2R  0.5176 0.5167 0.5508 0.4952 0.4936 0.5221 
Number of obs. 3907 2763 2132 3907 2763 2132 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
Adjusted 
 
 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.330851*** 2.350985*** 2.455815*** 2.367411*** 2.379352*** 2.460707*** 
DEBT 3.023006*** 3.14*** 3.751931*** -.0847693*** -.1063811*** -.1363553*** 
ROA .0015055 .0016028 -1.957124* .0326731 .0383172 .0783111** 
MSR -10.59714 59.04129* 68.48328* -.0935603 .0795601 .0103174 
CDS .1003085* .0942738 .2346243*** -.0833835 -.0000364 .0469722 
CR .0003385 .0010399 .0013119 -.0043883 -.0034992 -.0045209 
TAXFAVOR .2255552*** .2030342*** .1758356** .2453466*** .2330004*** .2277695*** 
STO .5517822*** .5439574*** .5078744*** -.0058243 -.0047665 -.004753 
_CONS -1.836778*** -1.875158*** -1.990147*** -3.360705*** -3.752363*** -4.477984*** 
2R  0.5113 0.5142 0.5488 0.4869 0.4888 0.5162 
Number of 
obs. 
3744 2652 2039 3744 2652 2039 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
“Sample” means the original data. “Sample adjusted” means that both the firm-fixed effect and 
time-specific effect are removed through a data-transformation. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX III: Supplementary Results   
 
This appendix will present the full set of results. They will include the correlation 
table of variables based on the original data, as well as the adjusted data (the data 
transformation procedure is provided in appendix I). The following tables show the 
correlations of some variables employed in table 3. Notice that the correlations are 
typically small in magnitude easing the concern of multi-collinearity. 
 
Table A1-a: Correlation Table for original data 
 SIZE EPS EFFICIENCY STO TAXFAVOR 
SIZE 1.0000     
EPS 0.0609 1.0000    
EFFICIENCY 0.1086 0.0095 1.0000   
STO 0.1942 -0.0086 0.0146 1.0000  
TAXFAVOR 0.0253 -0.0004 -0.0088 0.1262 1.0000 
 
 Table A1-b: Correlation Table for adjusted data 
 
ADJ_ 
SIZE 
ADJ_ 
EPS 
ADJ_ 
EFFICIENCY 
ADJ_ 
STO 
TAXFAV
OR 
ADJ_SIZE 1.0000     
ADJ_EPS 0.0415 1.0000    
ADJ_EFFICI
ENCY 
0.0908 0.0080 1.0000   
ADJ_STO -0.1038 -0.0085 -0.0261 1.0000  
TAXFAVOR -0.0053 -0.0114 -0.0084 -0.1295 1.0000 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following tables show the correlations of some variables employed in table 4. 
 
Table A2-a Correlation Table for original data 
 DEBT ROA MSR CDS CR TAXFAVOR STO 
DEBT 1.0000       
ROA -0.0176 1.0000      
MSR 0.0131 0.0017 1.0000     
CDS 0.0606 -0.0042 -0.0224 1.0000    
CR 0.0594 -0.0137 -0.0492 0.1821 1.0000   
TAXFAVOR 0.0338 0.0115 -0.0117 0.0222 0.1083 1.0000  
STO 0.0749 -0.0201 -0.0361 0.1469 0.3937 0.1269 1.0000
 
Table A2-b Correlation Table for adjusted data 
 ADJ_DEBT ADJ_ROA ADJ_MSR ADJ_CDS ADJ_CR TAXFAVOR ADJ_STO 
ADJ_DEBT 1.0000       
ADJ_ROA 0.0131 1.0000      
ADJ_MSR 0.3544 -0.0249 1.0000     
ADJ_CDS -0.2036 -0.0447 -0.5298 1.0000    
ADJ_CR -0.1021 0.0682 -0.1789 0.1599 1.0000   
TAXFAVOR -0.0230 0.0329 -0.0284 0.0339 0.1045 1.0000  
ADJ_STO 0.1718 -0.0041 0.2373 -0.1409 -0.7416 -0.1306 1.0000 
 
 
Since the correlation between CR and STO is strong, we carry a supplementary regression without CR 
and find very similar results. The results are detailed in the following table. 
Table A3:  Determinants of FAH (with STO, without CR) 
Panel 1: all firms included 
 
Full sample 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with positive 
profit) 
Sub-sample2  
(firms with positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.362994*** 2.372606*** 2.480505*** 2.385426*** 2.386387*** 2.470922*** 
DEBT 2.779786*** 2.824907*** 3.334496*** -.0783309*** -.1047421*** -.1260472*** 
ROA .0015132 .0016093 -1.88527* .0295541 .0402565 .072619* 
MSR -11.41648 38.57942 44.80806* -.0585514 .1142093 .0386106 
CDS .0973418* .0908581 .226055*** -.0693603 .0100978 .0548329 
TAXFAVOR .285801*** .2716491*** .2755831*** .2955087*** .2904808*** .3002736*** 
STO .5914657*** .640362*** .5940754*** -.0019399 -.0018289 -.0003311 
_CONS -1.891251*** -1.908922*** -2.026369*** -3.250218*** -3.761129*** -4.276516*** 
2R  0.5174 0.5162 0.5504 0.4948 0.4934 0.5215 
Number of obs. 3907 2763 2132  3907 2763  2132 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
 
Full sample 
 
Sub-sample1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
Full sample 
adjusted 
Sub-sample1 
Adjusted 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
Sub-sample2 
adjusted 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.330755*** 2.350512*** 2.454391*** 2.366045*** 2.378564*** 2.460159*** 
DEBT 3.02371*** 3.141186*** 3.759745*** -.0858407*** -.1074575*** -.1386384*** 
ROA .001508 .0016099 -1.880481* .0301591 .0360304 .0737645 
MSR -10.62652 58.80291* 68.09205* -.0893521 .0837306 .0151253 
CDS .1015522* .0987972 .2395042*** -.0810383 .0010686 .0471202 
TAXFAVOR .2261418*** .2051381*** .1792026** .2448612*** .2322364*** .2264011*** 
STO .5605328*** .5707704*** .5398175*** -.0015179 -.0013299 -.0002881 
_CONS -1.8214*** -1.828301*** -1.93347*** -3.331745*** -3.732612*** -4.469621*** 
2R  0.5113 0.5141 0.5487 0.4866 0.4887 0.5160 
Number of obs.  3744 2652 2039  3744  2652 2039 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Appendix IV: Results by year and by industry 
Table B1:  Jensen’s alpha and FAH  
Panel 1: all firms included 
Full sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .8119369*** -.1753384 -.4124859** -.6202331*** -.2139691 
STO .0311299 .1953288 .2961472* .0290562 -.623057*** 
CDS .2502712** .2792425*** .4951068*** .2791841*** .4315331* 
DUAL .1226008 -.1954264 -.07882 .1645674 -.0742982 
MSR 100.1648 -70.18654 121.4997 32.98808 25.26051 
OE -.1823976*** -.1025048 -.0423368 .0130365 -.0104722 
CR -.0027722 .0041058 .0154034*** .003829 .017964*** 
SIZE .7405424*** .0152326 -.006866 .1615505*** -.0983676 
TAXFAVOR .1562824* -.3450564*** -.1018381 -.1610924** .1138081 
_CONS -11.77444*** 2.207723* -.0280494 -3.887345*** .5282354 
2R  0.1361 0.0286 0.0559 0.0432 0.0423 
Number of obs. 1156  875 1165 1155 1161 
sub sample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .6711857** -.3135369 -.3057447 -.6275377*** -.1861942 
STO .0796513 -.0522279 .2374493 -.016621 -.6068332** 
CDS .2684457** .3410954*** .4338071*** .3370702*** .2406944 
DUAL .1753302 -.2512532 .0185407 .1883653 -.0852801 
MSR 73.3565 12.74993 55.69149 26.91751 25.95201 
OE -.2306665*** -.139919** -.0925179* .0379191 -.0124805 
CR -.0043975 .0059051 .0150384*** .0042095 .0161046*** 
SIZE .7984314*** .0157157 .0352526 .1456142*** -.1120676* 
TAXFAVOR .116819 -.3452401*** -.1886218** -.1815849** .0598325 
_CONS -11.97596*** 2.87289** .0493981 -4.025217*** .9849299 
2R  0.1453 0.0368 0.0499 0.0482 0.0381 
Number of obs.  978  724  983  974 966 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .6439525** -.2454035 -.1158801 -.6435839*** -.2777963 
STO .2445396 -.1734288 .2368696 -.0643535 -.7517645*** 
CDS .1736304 .1067992 .2292655** .2235972** .2314706 
DUAL .1878915 -.2595919 .0707534 .2444407* -.1520461 
MSR 58.00973 -77.72741 16.45076 30.15301 25.02832 
OE -.0925315 .0301357 .0951342 .1271694** .0383201 
CR -.0067689 .0064255 .01465*** .0046313 .0182953*** 
SIZE .6565551*** -.143858 -.1038956 .0876941 -.140292** 
TAXFAVOR .0530175 -.389248*** -.3673176*** -.1554992 .1335478 
_CONS -11.16336*** 3.483079** -.0364648 -4.332235*** .57312 
2R  0.1184 0.0265 0.0409 0.0420 0.0457 
Number of obs.  864  628  766 838 883 
 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
Full sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .7931185*** -.1734007 -.2464039 -.4520533** -.2048437 
STO -.0756957 .1875166 .3147985** .0240428 -.5213513** 
CDS .2324495** .3116412 .5253868*** .2690134*** .4591947* 
DUAL .1103001 -.2432923*** -.0588603 .1472347 -.085995 
MSR 11.70853 -148.4825 74.88486 7.396686 29.86682 
OE -.1897722*** -.0909587 -.0087714 .046923 -.0233632 
CR -.0023298 .0043723 .0152011*** .0033411 .0188617*** 
SIZE .783056*** -.0136325 -.0544175 .1231554** -.1257123** 
TAXFAVOR .1252372 -.3416221*** -.0540475 -.0978536 .1239275 
_CONS -12.47158*** 2.58818** .2612259 -3.768959*** 1.259306 
2R  0.1446 0.0298 0.0571 0.0342 0.0480 
Number of obs. 1104 840  1116  1107 1109 
sub sample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .6990721** -.2759916 -.1095014 -.5020436** -.1476656 
STO .0135662 -.0192008 .2404578 -.022815 -.4919803* 
CDS .2383232** .3622856*** .4685517*** .3391698*** .235552 
DUAL .163835 -.3009329* .0338385 .1702022 -.0926012 
MSR -14.62546 -19.85798 -6.309849 -6.118488 31.5178* 
OE -.2354797*** -.1255762* -.0609073 .0613635 -.0230655 
CR -.0040892 .0060317 .0146339*** .0036306 .017094*** 
SIZE .8330937*** -.013623 -.0120592 .1176276** -.1521156** 
TAXFAVOR .0951117 -.3357143*** -.139398 -.1342266 .0886067 
_CONS -12.58059*** 3.187449** .3732968 -3.907845*** 1.91102** 
2R  0.1523 0.0364 0.0496 0.0416 0.0464 
Number of obs. 933 694 941  940  922 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2003 
 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .7138354** -.1197232 .105529 -.4994875** -.2132759 
STO .1681075 -.1460979 .2290967 -.0535069 -.6128861** 
CDS .1525608 .1229327 .2637848*** .216654** .2218832 
DUAL .1458262 -.3117589 .1097375 .2290926 -.1442059 
MSR -26.38241 -126.6061 -41.21278 -2.873866 30.43969 
OE -.1096944 .0513051 .1438811* .1618251** .0298092 
CR -.0060678 .0070323 .0143*** .0041054 .0192504*** 
SIZE .7123896*** -.1802806* -.1744993** .0488973 -.1869773** 
TAXFAVOR .049726 -.36065** -.3026917*** -.1017829 .1602513 
_CONS -12.04545*** 3.752834*** .453901 -4.200466*** 1.593685* 
2R  0.1295 0.0271 0.0413 0.0371 0.0532 
Number of obs. 823 601 728  808 842 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
Table B2:  Jensen’s alpha and FAH (with SH dummy) 
Panel 1: all firms included 
Full sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .8040665*** -.1585738 -.4184712* -.6323596*** -.2126324 
STO .0265992 .1902987 .2915186* .0132359 -.628696*** 
CDS .2770064** .2650572** .5063923*** .2948476*** .4462044* 
DUAL .1169917 -.1926461 -.088801 .1518522 -.0789641 
MSR 77.78351 -16.13151 81.91855 14.26622 24.3804 
OE -.1804032*** -.1037689 -.0428628 .0148371 -.0108012 
CR -.0026133 .0035072 .0157349*** .0042315 .0182031*** 
SIZE .7390013*** .0186355 -.0045923 .1643037*** -.0961229 
TAXFAVOR .155454* -.3378221*** -.1057801 -.1642572** .1122748 
SH -.0608071 .1016695 -.092924 -.1672345** -.0850308 
_CONS -11.75127*** 2.130498* -.0243427 -3.891563*** .5273055 
2R  0.1364 0.0297 0.0567 0.0459 0.0431 
Number of obs.  1156 875 1165  1155 1161 
sub sample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .6701419** -.2975167 -.3138483 -.6428366*** -.187599 
STO .0789586 -.0572222 .2302868 -.0313698 -.6100334** 
CDS .2719588** .3271681*** .4472539*** .353501*** .2552829 
DUAL .1745259 -.2460972 .0073777 .1774621 -.0893309 
MSR 70.8485 62.00872 17.6643 10.81051 25.3309 
OE -.2303934*** -.1420881** -.0942718* .040992 -.0123358 
CR -.004377 .0052471 .0154034*** .0046531 .0162506*** 
SIZE .7981345*** .0191035 .0380161 .147091*** -.1107147* 
TAXFAVOR .1167232 -.3396619*** -.1905253** -.184107** .0601751 
SH -.0077319 .0962841 -.0977379 -.1626203* -.0626373 
_CONS -11.97135*** 2.821266** .064176 -4.032852*** .9839103 
2R  0.1453 0.0377 0.0508 0.0508 0.0386 
Number of obs.  978  724  983 974 966 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2003 
 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .6297272* -.2246794 -.1338286 -.6721429*** -.28063 
STO .2363362 -.1847829 .2166221 -.0845952 -.7565508*** 
CDS .253213* .0905567 .2423236** .2481792*** .25413 
DUAL .1736241 -.2545542 .057461 .2289945* -.1586497 
MSR 5.328081 -23.14066 -35.22 10.10972 24.13992 
OE -.0877393 .0291166 .094935 .1321494** .0394339 
CR -.0064966 .0056582 .015247*** .0052934 .0185703*** 
SIZE .6549978*** -.1395481 -.1033324 .0862689 -.1391326** 
TAXFAVOR .0534264 -.3838783*** -.3700829*** -.1626155* .1344371 
SH -.1788626 .1163353 -.1434683 -.2135126** -.0949986 
_CONS -11.13291*** 3.387842** .0231951 -4.287506*** .5710161 
2R  0.1209 0.0279 0.0428 0.0465 0.0467 
Number of obs.  863 628  766 838 883 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
Full sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .7832791*** -.1600543 -.2543897 -.4637363** -.20536 
STO -.0809109 .1826065 .3086797* .000795 -.52714**1 
CDS .2642191** .2997102*** .5390017*** .2852864*** .4783355* 
DUAL .1032254 -.239869 -.0704317 .1315627 -.0912331 
MSR -12.73335 -100.1769 30.90044 -27.97977 28.87232 
OE -.1879227*** -.0923689 -.0096004 .0487345 -.0241262 
CR -.0021392 .0038924 .0155362*** .0037744 .0190875*** 
SIZE .7818807*** -.010202 -.0518797 .1267299** -.1226614* 
TAXFAVOR .1240956 -.3351386*** -.0592664 -.1021579 .1211552 
SH -.0724544 .0849924 -.1049348 -.1766668** -.0843979 
_CONS -12.44822*** 2.516167** .2738506 -3.782017*** -.20536 
2R  0.1450 0.0306 0.0581 0.0373 0.0487 
Number of obs. 1104  840  1116  1107 1109 
sub sample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .6975455** -.2646461 -.1214533 -.5168652** -.1509677 
STO .012563 -.0237665 .2311624 -.0435816 -.4945765* 
CDS .2436336* .3520747*** .4842667*** .3560649*** .2547475 
DUAL .1624676 -.2957313 .0213858 .1571464 -.0973241 
MSR -18.05697 18.18482 -48.23613 -36.80222 30.76619* 
OE -.2351839*** -.1275583* -.063384 .0643208 -.0232587 
CR -.0040549 .0055622 .0150012*** .0040792 .0172183*** 
SIZE .8327378*** -.010525 -.0085706 .1200187** -.1500138** 
TAXFAVOR .0949731 -.3312837*** -.1424904 -.1380667 .0877155 
SH -.0116952 .0710337 -.1101179 -.1675205* -.0624604 
_CONS -12.57372*** 3.142518** .3958454 -3.925728*** 1.902764** 
2R  0.1523 0.0369 0.0507 0.0443 0.0468 
Number of obs. 933  694  941  940 922 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2003 
 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
Jensen alpha Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH .7017671** -.1067006 .0790411 -.5283487** -.2201915 
STO .1579903 -.1550894 .202589 -.0831323 -.6177736** 
CDS .2384658* .1101535 .2798211*** .2418022** .2553971 
DUAL .1257594 -.3064647 .0938526 .2117231 -.1535143 
MSR -78.43647 -81.67981 -99.39441 -40.02461 29.23022 
OE -.1067732 .0498714 .1417818* .1668152** .0304984 
CR -.0056481 .0064377 .0149165*** .0047728 .0195408*** 
SIZE .7126987*** -.1759342* -.1720153** .0489666 -.1844745** 
TAXFAVOR .0494809 -.3572527** -.3085001*** -.110112 .1594756 
SH -.1944629 .0910396 -.167039 -.2155381** -.1076627 
_CONS -12.02066*** 3.670374** .5281218 -4.181081*** 1.580026 
2R  0.1324 0.0280 0.0439 0.0416 0.0545 
Number of obs. 823  601 728 808 842 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B3:  Beta risk and FAH  
Panel 1: all firms included  
Full sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.2796455 -.4452973* -.537239** -.7802306*** -.6328825*** 
STO .3264466** .5361848** .2364323 .2892868 .4766462** 
CDS .0747384 -.2003194** -.3101572*** .2017724** .3268458 
DUAL -.0330729 -.3680205** -.153855 -.1224203 -.1599691 
MSR -128.7067 -68.63016 -175.0137 -32.12302 7.915254 
OE -.0171227 -.0653433 .0583731 .0388753 -.0613625 
CR -.0076669** -.0030703 -.0044467 .0005656 -.0042445 
SIZE .0529877 .0101535 -.1133476** .0674547 .2553621*** 
TAXFAVOR -.1195878 -.1106168 .1717776** .1908311** .156533* 
_CONS .2573198 1.70428* 2.392304*** -2.668239*** -4.77479*** 
2R  0.0100 0.0197 0.0305 0.0282 0.0411 
Number of obs.  1156  875 1165  1155  1161 
sub sample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.2764505 -.451487* -.5062063** -.6060113*** -.5083939** 
STO .4304214** .4460088 .2806362 .2756972 .4616673** 
CDS .1299784 -.1572868 -.2519337*** .2000839** .2354654 
DUAL .0400225 -.3578063** -.2038585 -.1524633 -.1698708 
MSR -190.7424 -84.58573 -219.3487 -23.57523 8.135847 
OE -.0081751 -.0689209 .1158993** .0111368 -.0698821 
CR -.0104404*** -.0022059 -.0064331* -.000029 -.0041407 
SIZE .0338438 -.0093345 -.1957017*** .0624996 .2438286*** 
TAXFAVOR -.0829606 -.1841713* .1598395* .2021627** .1244551 
_CONS .6149216 2.227773* 3.223879*** -2.067583** -4.391223*** 
2R  0.0147 0.0207 0.0369 0.0225 0.0345 
Number of obs. 978  724 983 974  966 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2003 
 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.3118453 -.4086975 -.6000647** -.6235183** -.4904585** 
STO .4011247** .3671636 .5607556*** .1372987 .5245476** 
CDS .1598739 -.0678388 -.2255567** .264936*** .194158 
DUAL .0548874 -.3765637** -.2957067* -.1752451 -.1291116 
MSR -202.9323 -56.44337 -149.165 -17.30354 8.659952 
OE -.0476016 -.1516936* -.0002287 -.0086325 -.0924533 
CR -.0093364** -.0019143 -.0068209* .000795 -.0034296 
SIZE .0660835 .0417351 -.1088464 .0560054 .2376407*** 
TAXFAVOR -.1050625 -.1363808 .2192153** .2666796*** .1329485 
_CONS .5607241 2.519434** 3.310563*** -1.661457* -3.886959*** 
2R  0.0156 0.0207 0.0386 0.0235 0.0309 
Number of obs. 863  628  766 838 883 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded  
Full sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.2173021 -.4254228 -.4428758* -.8612801*** -.6683814*** 
STO .2809235* .4065738 .2580045 .2302768 .4843735** 
CDS .0818947 -.192398** -.3101563*** .2166658** .4734926* 
DUAL -.0286098 -.351488** -.1132412 -.1298612 -.1492677 
MSR -162.139 -82.1258 -224.7493* 3.91162 11.49139 
OE -.0093717 -.0666516 .0728977 .0212156 -.0511246 
CR -.0065674* -.0010512 -.0046165 -.0000299 -.0048945 
SIZE .0280288 -.0002703 -.1288995** .0876285 .2571312*** 
TAXFAVOR -.0998536 -.1044 .207807** .1996899** .1452503 
_CONS .5529279 1.865094* 2.392236*** -2.71715*** -4.951534**** 
2R  0.0075 0.0175 0.0321  0.0300 0.0411 
Number of obs. 1104  840  1116 1107 1109 
sub sample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.1822998 -.3807409 -.377498 -.6922088*** -.5931564** 
STO .4027787** .3012193 .297884 .2118042 .4840228** 
CDS .129681 -.1589101 -.2524827*** .2013096** .4087814 
DUAL .068201 -.3127278* -.1855862 -.1471202 -.1475917 
MSR -215.288 -160.2325 -288.0294* 19.86509 11.56842 
OE .010707 -.0553373 .1354553** -.0012015 -.0717581 
CR -.0098275** -.0008014 -.0061187 -.0004507 -.0049886 
SIZE -.0044886 -.0270204 -.2157867*** .0818572 .2609036*** 
TAXFAVOR -.0565529 -.1516695 .1964959** .2033534** .0954461 
_CONS 1.000429 2.280633* 3.191237*** -2.190064** -4.640467*** 
2R  0.0125 0.0169 0.0390 0.0233 0.0381 
Number of obs. 933  694  941 940 922 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2003 
 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.2469019 -.341561 -.4774332* -.7308101*** -.579531** 
STO .3697165** .2202508 .5717015*** .0921177 .5482246** 
CDS .1662318 -.0740915 -.2199564** .2722168*** .3679118 
DUAL .0977239 -.3312213* -.2652145* -.1695864 -.1172776 
MSR -225.728 -138.9295 -220.174 34.48149 11.9944 
OE -.0426686 -.134044 .0279152 -.0234977 -.0953404 
CR -.0085537** -.0004426 -.0067167 .0002336 -.0041853 
SIZE .0393551 .0176791 -.1352446 .07758 .2563013*** 
TAXFAVOR -.068498 -.1097025 .2710413** .2712982*** .1054167 
_CONS .9386615 2.642963** 3.257301*** -1.785995* -4.156902*** 
2R  0.0132 0.0170 0.0402 0.0253 0.0348 
Number of obs.  823  601  728 808 842 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
Table B4:  Beta risk and FAH (with SH dummy) 
Panel 1: all firms included  
Full sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.2795596 -.4302618* -.5391465** -.7821079*** -.6328271*** 
STO .3265378** .5268301** .232453 .2868747 .4763089** 
CDS .0742295 -.2214416** -.3059187*** .2042469** .3276126 
DUAL -.0329963 -.3680619** -.1575299 -.1244496 -.1600447 
MSR -128.3835 17.81756 -193.9891 -35.12797 7.869056 
OE -.0171382 -.0682473 .0584293 .0390748 -.0613429 
CR -.0076717** -.0039287 -.0042721 .0006282 -.0042283 
SIZE .0529909 .0154512 -.1125938** .0679789 .2554766*** 
TAXFAVOR -.1195598 -.1024818 .1698694** .1903468** .1562942* 
SH .0011634 .1582494* -.0448866 -.0268582 -.0053555 
_CONS .2571613 1.602801 2.395544*** -2.669046*** -4.774923*** 
2R  0.0100 0.0221 0.0307 0.0283 0.0411 
Number of obs. 1156  875  1165 1155 1161 
sub sample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.2764367 -.431999 -.5102567** -.6120405*** -.5071664** 
STO .4304389** .4345626 .2744084 .2702991 .4650306** 
CDS .129878 -.1826644* -.2457209*** .2066542** .2221762 
DUAL .040037 -.3526243** -.2095843 -.1567516 -.1691325 
MSR -190.6844 11.42194 -242.5037* -30.01627 8.617748 
OE -.008178 -.0737275 .1153756** .0120304 -.071104 
CR -.0104414*** -.00346 -.0061878* .0001344 -.0043221 
SIZE .0338457 -.0025333 -.1945751*** .0634352 .2433502*** 
TAXFAVOR -.0829536 -.1772017* .1589067* .2013318** .1262957 
SH .000224 .1831505* -.0567377 -.0661788 .0625441 
_CONS .6148717 2.141551* 3.23266*** -2.070992** -4.389444*** 
2R  0.0147 0.0239 0.0372 0.0230 0.0349 
Number of obs. 978  724  983  974 966 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2003 
 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.3089638 -.3822833 -.6066059** -.6274348** -.4901949** 
STO .4032086** .3472782 .5505126*** .1342392 .5275112** 
CDS .1364358 -.0999182 -.2216756** .2688319*** .1784305 
DUAL .0573081 -.3736765** -.3004344** -.1776937 -.1286059 
MSR -190.2524 69.64364 -171.5555 -20.33585 9.205858 
OE -.0478872 -.1589173** .0005594 -.0082093 -.094201 
CR -.0095397** -.0035935 -.0065533 .0008972 -.0036659 
SIZE .0661552 .0534121 -.1090367 .0559636 .2375878*** 
TAXFAVOR -.1038379 -.1285279 .2182495** .2655833*** .1354415 
SH .0518221 .2493521** -.0598567 -.0344212 .0738396 
_CONS .5493362 2.361919* 3.328381*** -1.651515* -3.888569*** 
2R  0.0847 0.0266 0.0389 0.0236 0.0315 
Number of obs. 863  628 766 838 883 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded  
Full sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.2143651 -.4128734 -.4444122* -.863884*** -.6687597*** 
STO .2839738* .3957332 .255343 .2250022 .4805695** 
CDS .0660428 -.2152696** -.3073488*** .2203996*** .4831127* 
DUAL -.0258374 -.3487043** -.1156111 -.1335076 -.1500444 
MSR -152.0797 19.22589 -236.5268* -4.104646 11.09261 
OE -.0096504 -.0714223 .0728761 .0215239 -.0510727 
CR -.0067205* -.0019661 -.0045219 .000071 -.0047477 
SIZE .0278831 .0073185 -.1284185** .0885098 .2583712*** 
TAXFAVOR -.0988803 -.0964941 .2064885** .1986239** .1424597 
SH .0362835 .1711129* -.0268338 -.0409293 -.046994 
_CONS .5494205 1.746417* 2.395438*** -2.719405*** -4.954766*** 
2R  0.0076 0.0204 0.0322 0.0302 0.0434 
Number of obs. 1104  840  1116  1107 1109 
sub sample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2003 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
2007 
 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.1804835 -.3660801 -.3818751 -.6984735*** -.5924218** 
STO .4053275** .2840993 .2925148 .2034522 .4848328 
CDS .1164725 -.1862546* -.2472757*** .208621** .4045524 
DUAL .0707082 -.3018303* -.1900767 -.1526986 -.1473868 
MSR -207.6982 -47.07185 -307.5536* 6.664941 11.67451 
OE .0105307 -.0635842 .1348631** -.0002875 -.0719556 
CR -.0099698** -.0021674 -.0059497 -.0002659 -.0050287 
SIZE -.004438 -.0164112 -.2147185*** .083177 .2606457*** 
TAXFAVOR -.0556236 -.1458196 .1953939** .2016872** .0961345 
SH .0294829 .2023746* -.0443726 -.0735367 .0141893 
_CONS .9947504 2.176667* 3.199699*** -2.196583** -4.638714*** 
2R  0.0126 0.0209 0.0392 0.0239 0.0381 
Number of obs.  933  694  941 940 922 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2003 
 
 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
BETA Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
FAH -.2432123 -.3271502 -.4837958* -.7356776*** -.5785977** 
STO .3735652** .1944323 .5633903*** .0863417 .5493657** 
CDS .1336458 -.1077373 -.2166783** .2772031*** .360229 
DUAL .1031009 -.3213323* -.269028* -.1731897 -.1169059 
MSR -208.0655 1.771558 -237.9724 27.02147 12.18006 
OE -.0426887 -.1461184* .0280613 -.0230044 -.0957949 
CR -.0088689** -.002215 -.0065407 .0003683 -.0042682 
SIZE .039119 .0350099 -.1349499 .0778009 .2560219*** 
TAXFAVOR -.0664619 -.1062184 .2696763** .2695015*** .1067508 
SH .0724226 .2645903** -.0450563 -.0438492 .025758 
_CONS .9243122 2.460233* 3.27224*** -1.777281* -4.155292*** 
2R  0.0136 0.0237 0.0404 0.0255 0.0349 
Number of obs. 823  601 728 808 842 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B5:  Determinants of FAH 
Panel 1: all firms included 
Full sample 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.200959*** 2.524716*** 2.607922*** 2.357021*** 
DEBT 2.834036*** 3.049783*** 1.949089*** 3.352256*** 
ROA .095485 -.5832873* .0017659 -.0757511 
MSR -110.4211 -184.1614 29.89415 -7.028254 
CDS -.00306 -.0745399 -.0411724 .5574478* 
CR -.005624 -.002749 .0005457 -.0002576 
TAXFAVOR .2225384* .2879745** .3010066*** .3707092*** 
STO .4367464 .1141929 .5669491** .5680364** 
_CONS -1.223683*** -1.332445*** -1.92278*** -2.206242*** 
2R  0.4661 0.5503 0.5743 0.5112 
Number of obs. 
 841 835 
 1114 1113 
Subsample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2004 2005 
2006 2007 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.282353*** 2.635542*** 2.525547*** 2.399775*** 
DEBT 2.765218*** 2.774483*** 2.162334*** 3.575437*** 
ROA .1457079 -.3240461 .0019013 -.8998162 
MSR -82.31578 -420.3093 41.54595 51.48334* 
CDS -.1203722 -.0174685 -.0467405 .5658462 
CR -.001292 -.0041267 -.0033247 .0007261 
TAXFAVOR .2314609 .2080218 .2828253** .3865336*** 
STO .3712296 .0721576 .5957659** .5798315* 
_CONS -1.419024*** -1.213044*** -1.666649*** -2.299995*** 
2R  0.4801 0.5733 0.5506 0.5115 
Number of obs.  595  594  789  785 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.248547*** 2.926359*** 2.668217*** 2.53299*** 
DEBT 2.764347*** 5.723442*** 2.328462*** 3.887353*** 
ROA -3.327948* -.0345926 -.0271446 .8632922 
MSR -127.1071 -223.7283 10.52727 55.77416** 
CDS -.0123765 .168091 .0419794 .6368089 
CR .0045096 -.0092701 -.0032876 -.0016261 
TAXFAVOR .2669368 .1932231 .1960308 .4072517*** 
STO .2501015 -.322637 .5501376* .9581939*** 
_CONS -1.656647*** -1.224913** -1.776327*** -2.534711*** 
2R  0.4732 0.6470 0.5918 0.0411 
Number of obs. 
 467  437 
 587 641 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded 
Full sample 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.16739*** 2.472009*** 2.57175*** 2.337338*** 
DEBT 2.931238*** 3.163813*** 2.353936*** 3.558521*** 
ROA .0855604 -.5652297* .0017415 -.0826313 
MSR -150.4244 -214.6766 37.21783 -6.456255 
CDS .0326861 -.0703307 -.0322696 .4157233 
CR -.0077357 -.0031837 .002133 .0000541 
TAXFAVOR .1653629 .231794* .2351695** .3092181*** 
STO .5383708 .1029652 .4920323** .4958228* 
_CONS -1.092293*** -1.232038*** -1.933719*** -2.137938*** 
2R  0.4609 0.5386 0.5678 0.5069 
Number of obs. 
806  805 
1068  1065 
Subsample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2004 2005 
2006 2007 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.241711*** 2.585194*** 2.493376*** 2.394014*** 
DEBT 2.897757*** 2.858465*** 2.685225*** 3.948812*** 
ROA .1832763 -.3201591 .0018717 -.8578723 
MSR -71.01637 -418.0907 48.73501 76.72167 
CDS -.114581 .0058122 -.0376767 .305064 
CR -.0020279 -.0046496 -.0012184 .0009135 
TAXFAVOR .1350133 .1431567 .2115396 .3223634** 
STO .422906 .0686788 .4875135* .4662114 
_CONS -1.299289*** -1.11049*** -1.702012*** -2.233899*** 
2R  0.4710 0.5616 0.5475 0.5134 
Number of obs. 567 570  762  753 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.211719*** 2.871295*** 2.630762*** 2.527277*** 
DEBT 2.923351*** 6.0087*** 3.169387*** 4.356674*** 
ROA -3.52902 .2001375 -.3861588 1.309307 
MSR -111.8475 -201.5244 20.62094 84.22491 
CDS -.0089866 .1916204 .0545529 .2986509 
CR .00414 -.0106841 -.0010402 -.0017728 
TAXFAVOR .1536637 .0792943 .0918652 .3523907** 
STO .2985434 -.3543776 .4397858 .8620629** 
_CONS -1.535163*** -1.025985** -1.795524*** -2.491806*** 
2R  0.4639 0.6383 0.5894 0.5571 
Number of obs.  443  416  565  615 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table B6:  Determinants of FAH (with SH dummy) 
Panel 1: all firms included  
Full sample 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.202435*** 2.526737*** 2.607751*** 2.357149*** 
DEBT 2.832197*** 3.002755*** 1.94697*** 3.347048*** 
ROA .0928043 -.5806459** .00177 -.0746004 
MSR -97.86129 -286.1992 25.93383 -7.130773 
CDS -.0058286 -.0537309 -.0397594 .5610173* 
CR -.0057123 -.002122 .0005772 -.0001782 
TAXFAVOR .2237005* .2803093** .3014121*** .3710571*** 
STO .4343718 .1191988 .5666422** .5690088** 
SH .0203996 -.1677495 -.013642 -.0256713 
_CONS -1.22978*** -1.270113*** -1.916367*** -2.195064*** 
2R  0.4661 0.5517 0.5743 0.5113 
Number of obs. 841 839  1114 1113 
Subsample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2004 2005 2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.281162*** 2.644075*** 2.524718*** 2.399564*** 
DEBT 2.764368*** 2.67193*** 2.149665*** 3.562513*** 
ROA .1482389 -.3132312 .001916 -.9018549 
MSR -97.82491 -538.0384 28.78482 50.4973* 
CDS -.1158148 .0091353 -.0409182 .5705139 
CR -.0011539 -.0029081 -.0032251 .0008588 
TAXFAVOR .2303442 .2078546 .2869178** .3883238*** 
STO .3755037 .0938049 .5939262** .5801753* 
SH -.0267711 -.238597 -.0505022 -.041979 
_CONS -1.414418*** -1.16249*** -1.644419*** -2.282287*** 
2R  0.4802 0.5760 0.5507 0.5116 
Number of obs.  595 594  789  785 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
2004 2005 2006 
 
2007 
 
positive 
efficiency) 
  
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.248459*** 2.933297*** 2.671217*** 2.534802*** 
DEBT 2.763979*** 5.607666*** 2.353725*** 3.867289*** 
ROA -3.332009* -.2023082 -.0134453 .8320564 
MSR -129.3809 -327.4102 19.20054 52.97767* 
CDS -.0115159 .1823731 .0365576 .6510676 
CR .0045369 -.0080686 -.0033457 -.0011515 
TAXFAVOR .2667888 .1993946 .1933073 .4095487*** 
STO .2508265 -.299426 .5544067* .9641342*** 
SH -.0041393 -.2080156 .0450594 -.1204762 
_CONS -1.656308*** -1.179501** -1.802613*** -2.488437*** 
2R  0.4732 0.6487 0.5919 0.5531 
Number of obs. 467  437  587 641 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Panel 2: real estate firms excluded  
Full sample 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.167463*** 2.474687*** 2.571482*** 2.337497*** 
DEBT 2.931119*** 3.117128*** 2.349279*** 3.551943*** 
ROA .0854166 -.5652194* .0017535 -.0810765 
MSR -149.5881 -316.5976 25.60174 -6.579106 
CDS .0325198 -.0489233 -.0281928 .4243088 
CR -.0077405 -.0026582 .0022376 .0001647 
TAXFAVOR .1654341 .2257824* .2358662** .3091835*** 
STO .5381978 .1086442 .4899568** .4973325* 
SH .0012473 -.1596074 -.0402541 -.036449 
_CONS -1.092684*** -1.170509*** -1.914773*** -2.121582*** 
2R  0.4609 0.5399 0.5679 0.5070 
Number of obs.  806 805  1068 1065 
Subsample 1 
(firms with 
positive profit) 
2004 2005 2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.240933*** 2.594841*** 2.49252*** 2.393654*** 
DEBT 2.896356*** 2.764233*** 2.670006*** 3.933709*** 
ROA .1856774 -.3141629 .001897 -.8609295 
MSR -91.86051 -533.7314 27.23353 75.00954 
CDS -.1095263 .0331092 -.0279572 .3190231 
CR -.0018613 -.0035978 -.0010254 .0010822 
TAXFAVOR .1335222 .1451156 .2172699 .3235189** 
STO .4291697 .0885848 .481436* .4674485 
SH -.0328423 -.2277111 -.0859125 -.0534919 
_CONS -1.293669*** -1.058561*** -1.664001*** -2.210518*** 
2R  0.4710 0.5642 0.5479 0.5136 
Number of obs.  567  570  762 753 
Subsample 2 
(firms with 
positive 
efficiency) 
2004 2005 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
FAH Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L.FAH 2.211731*** 2.880127*** 2.631344*** 2.529072*** 
DEBT 2.923102*** 5.912951*** 3.173355*** 4.340279*** 
ROA -3.531047* .0183467 -.3833117 1.270131 
MSR -113.0104 -304.4739 22.4204 80.1902** 
CDS -.0086081 .2082333 .0535119 .341868 
CR .0041535 -.0096138 -.001055 -.001232 
TAXFAVOR .1536178 .0871836 .0914938 .3517461** 
STO .2989301 -.3341801 .4409965 .8722282** 
SH -.0019502 -.1951882 .0090985 -.1269964 
_CONS -1.535077*** -.9836364* -1.800893*** -2.443573*** 
2R  0.4639 0.6399 0.5894 0.5580 
Number of obs.  443  416  565 615 
Key: “Coeff.” Stands for coefficient, “CONS” stands for the intercept term in the regression.  
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
  
 
